What is ethics? -- How the Bible guides Christian ethics -- Moral agent -- Sin -- Virtue -- Conscience -- Moral norms -- Biblical norms -- Moral consequences -- Ultimate ends.

When information on a coma patient’s expected outcome is uncertain, a moral dilemma arises in clinical practice: if life-sustaining treatment is continued, the patient may survive with unacceptably poor neurological prospects, but if withdrawn a patient who could have recovered may die. Continuous electroencephalogram-monitoring is expected to substantially improve neuroprognostication for patients in coma after cardiac arrest. This raises expectations that decisions whether or not to withdraw will become easier. This paper investigates that expectation, exploring cEEG’s impacts when it becomes (...) part of a socio-technical network in an Intensive Care Unit. Based on observations in two ICUs in the Netherlands and one in the USA that had cEEG implemented for research, we interviewed 25 family members, healthcare professionals, and surviving patients. The analysis focuses on the way patient outcomes are constructed, the kind of decision support these outcomes provide, and how cEEG affects communication between professionals and relatives. We argue that cEEG can take away or decrease the intensity of the dilemma in some cases, while increasing uncertainty for others. It also raises new concerns. Since its actual impacts furthermore hinge on how cEEG is designed and implemented, we end with recommendations for ensuring responsible development and implementation. (shrink)

Aim: To elicit preferences for prognostic information, attitudes towards withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment (WLST) and perspectives on acceptable quality of life after post-anoxic coma within the adult general population of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United States of America. Methods: A web-based survey, consisting of questions on respondent characteristics, perspectives on quality of life, communication of prognostic information, and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, was taken by adult respondents recruited from four countries. Statistical analysis included descriptive analysis and chi2-tests for (...) dierences between countries. Results: In total, 2012 respondents completed the survey. In each country, at least 84% indicated they would prefer to receive early prognostic information. If a poor outcome was predicted with some uncertainty, 37-54% of the respondents indicated that WLST was not to be allowed. A conscious state with severe physical and cognitive impairments was perceived as acceptable quality of life by 17–44% of the respondents. Clear differences between countries exist, including respondents from the U.S. being more likely to allow WLST than respondents from Germany (OR = 1.99, p < 0.001) or the Netherlands (OR = 1.74, p < 0.001) and preferring to stay alive in a conscious state with severe physical and cognitive impairments more than respondents from Italy (OR = 3.76, p < 0.001), Germany (OR = 2.21, p < 0.001), or the Netherlands (OR = 2.39, p < 0.001). Conclusions: Over one-third of the respondents considered WLST unacceptable when there is any remaining prognostic uncertainty. Respondents had a more positive perspective on acceptable quality of life after coma than what is currently considered acceptable in medical literature. This indicates a need for a closer look at the practice of WLST based on prognostic information, to ensure responsible use of novel prognostic tests. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:An Introduction to Christian Ethics: Goals, Duties, and Virtues by Robin W. Lovin, and: The Moral Disciple: An Introduction to Christian Ethics by Kent A. Van TilPaul J. WadellAn Introduction to Christian Ethics: Goals, Duties, and Virtues ROBIN W. LOVIN Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2011. 288 pp. $29.00The Moral Disciple: An Introduction to Christian Ethics KENT A. VAN TIL Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012. 160 pp. $18.00Over (...) the last several years a number of introductory texts in Christian ethics have been published. Robin Lovin’s An Introduction to Christian Ethics and Kent Van Til’s The Moral Disciple are impressive and worthy additions to that growing collection. Both are intended for undergraduate students—an audience, these authors realize, whose upbringing, history, and experiences are very different from their own. How can professors guide students through the thicket of choices and decisions that confront them every day, especially when they are bombarded with seemingly endlessly diverse answers about what is true, good, worthwhile, or fulfilling? When so much is constantly changing, how can professors help students understand what it means to live wisely, responsibly, and with integrity? How can they use the manifold traditions and resources of Christian ethics to help students discern the contours of a life that is truly worth living as well as the attitudes, dispositions, and choices that will enable them to achieve that? And, perhaps most challengingly, how can they do this when their students come to the study of ethics, as Lovin observes, with little more than “mere fragments of a moral vocabulary that has lost its meaning”? (238) With these questions in mind, Lovin and Van Til, wise and compassionate guides, lead the reader through the history of Christian ethics to illustrate how those who have gone before us, in all the different ways they understood the moral life, can assist us on our journey today.Both texts are structured around the customary focal points of goals and consequences (teleology), laws and norms (deontology), and character and virtue (areteology). In investigating each of these models for understanding ethics, [End Page 213] Van Til and Lovin give special attention to the influence of Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and Kant. And both offer an insightful, balanced overview of the natural law, the moral and theological virtues, and the abiding but sometimes overlooked influence of utilitarianism on our moral reasoning. Moreover, both texts offer ample examples or case studies along with clear, succinct definitions that help students connect the material to their lives and appreciate important differences among varied accounts of the moral life.But there are also interesting differences between these two books. Because Van Til is primarily concerned with what ethics means in a life of faithful discipleship, he places how one’s relationship with Christ shapes her identity, understanding of the world, and sense of moral agency more at the forefront of his analysis than does Lovin in his Introduction to Christian Ethics. This is not a shortcoming of Lovin’s text, but it indicates an important difference in their methodologies. For example, because Van Til emphasizes that the lives of Christians are primarily guided by the biblical narrative, he moves from asking in the opening chapter “What is ethics?” to considering in chapter 2 the role of the scriptures for illuminating how Christians understand God, themselves, and their place in the world. “Christians believe that the Bible is God’s true and complete revelation,” Van Til writes, “and we also trust that the moral guidance we receive from Scripture is the truest and most complete moral guidance available to us” (18). Nonetheless, Van Til rightly cautions that because the Bible is “not an ethics textbook … problems may arise if we try to make the Bible guide our morality in ways that the Bible itself does not intend” (18). Thus, determining how biblical teaching should inform moral decisions demands ongoing personal and communal discernment.By contrast, after an expansive and very helpful overview of the origin of ethics in his opening chapter, Lovin adopts Charles Curran’s well-known fivefold “Christian stance” to provide the overarching framework for understanding the distinctiveness of Christian ethics. He then probes four... (shrink)

Het nihilisme speelt niet alleen een rol binnen de westerse filosofie. Ook binnen de boeddhistische filosofische traditie is aandacht besteed aan deze problematiek. Het oude boeddhisme kent een heilsleer die uitmondt in nirwana, dat letterlijk ‘uitdoving’ betekent: het uitdoven van begeerte, haat en onwetendheid. In het latere mahayana-boeddhisme speelt het niets een nog grotere rol: de filosoof Nâgârjuna stelt keer op keer dat alles ‘leeg’ is : de dingen hebben geen substantie, geen eigen wezen, en bestaan niet op zichzelf. (...) De heilsleer van het mahayana-boeddhisme is gericht op het existentieel realiseren van deze sunyata. Mede vanwege deze opvattingen is het boeddhisme vanaf de negentiende eeuw in het Westen vaak gerecipieerd als een nihilisme. De boeddhistische opvattingen over sunyata zijn echter juist bedoeld om het nihilisme te overwinnen. (shrink)

I argue that the epistemology underlying Cornelius Van Til’s presuppositional apologetic methodology is quasi-fideist. According to this view, the rationality of religious belief is dependent on absolutely certain ungrounded grounds, called hinges. I further argue that the quasi-fideist epistemology of presuppositional apologetics explains why Van Til’s method is neither fideist nor problematically circular: hinges are rational in the sense that they are partly constitutive of rationality, and all beliefs (not just religious ones) depend on hinges. In addition, it illuminates something (...) of why it may strike one as a misguided or uncompelling apologetic method: instead of starting by tackling the comparatively minor epistemic commitments of the nonbeliever, it directly approaches their deepest and surest commitments. (shrink)

After the challenges of the Enlightenment from philosophers such as David Hume, contemporary philosophers of religion tend to think that proof is not possible and that at best humans have arguments for the probability or plausibility of belief in God. But, Christianity maintains that humans should know God. This book explores attempts to respond to the Enlightenment challenges by thinkers at Princeton Theological like Benjamin Warfield. It considers Warfield's view of reason and knowledge of God, his debate with Abraham Kuyper, (...) and the attempt to reconcile differences between these two by Cornelius Van Til. It also considers Reformed Epistemology, which has become popular in recent decades and is credited for a renewed interest in Christian philosophy. (shrink)

The Polish logician Jan Lukasiewicz and the American theologian Cornelius Van Til are famous for challenging Aristotle’s Principle of Contradiction.Whereas apparent contradictions such as God and physical reality being both One and Not One (Many) are accepted in terms of an idealism held by Van Til, the Principle’s violations in theology and science reflect a realism held by Lukasiewicz. Lukasiewicz is favored for explaining why the Principle’s violation may be rational for a scientific and theological realism.

This book investigates for the first time key theological and philosophical convictions of an influential, yet hitherto neglected, Dutch theologian who developed his ideas on the threshold between the age of Protestant orthodoxy and the emerging Enlightenment.

Some philosophers advance the claim that the phenomena of logical omniscience and of the indiscernibility of metaphysical statements, which arise in (certain) interpretations of normal modal logic, provide strong reasons in favour of impossible world approaches. These two specific lines of argument will be presented and discussed in this paper. Contrary to the recent much-held view that the characteristics of these two phenomena provide us with strong reasons to adopt impossible world approaches, the view defended here is that no such (...) ‘knock-down arguments’ do emanate on those grounds. This is not to rule out that there cannot be any other good reasons for assuming impossible world semantics. However, the discussion of a further argument for impossible worlds will suggest that different attempts to argue for them likely present intertwined problems. (shrink)

Psychopaths constitute less than 1% of the general population, but they commit a much larger proportion of crime and violence in society. This volume chronicles the latest science of psychopathy, various ways that psychopaths challenge the criminal justice system, and the major ethical issues arising from this fascinating condition.

China is the world’s second largest economy and the largest emitter of carbon dioxide, yet we know little about environmental proactivity in the most populated country in the world. We address this gap through a survey of 161 Chinese companies with two respondents per firm (N = 322), where we seek to identify the antecedents and consequences of environmental proactivity. We identify two categorizations of environmental proactivity: Environmental operational improvements and environmental reporting. We find that ecological motivations and regulatory stakeholder (...) pressure are positively related to both types of environmental proactivity, and external stakeholder pressure is negatively related to environmental reporting. Furthermore, we find that (1) if a firm is environmentally proactive (as it relates to either measure) and they are ecologically motivated, there is a positive and significant cost advantage, and (2) if a firm makes use of environmental operational improvement and they are competitively motivated, there is a positive and significant reputation advantage. Implications for researchers, managers, and policy-makers in China are discussed. (shrink)

This review takes a historical perspective on concepts in the psychology of motivation and emotion, and surveys recent developments, debates and applications. Old debates over emotion have recently risen again. For example, are emotions necessarily subjective feelings? Do animals have emotions? I review evidence that emotions exist also as core psychological processes, which have objectively detectable features, and which can occur either with subjective feelings or without them. Evidence is offered also that studies of emotion in animals can give new (...) insights into human emotions. Beyond emotion, motivation concepts also have changed over decades, and debates still continue. Motivation was once thought in terms of aversive drives, and reward was thought of in terms of drive reduction. Motivation-as-drive concepts were largely replaced by motivation-as-incentive concepts, yet aversive drive concepts still occasionally surface in motivation neuroscience today. Among incentive motivation concepts, incentive salience is a core process, mediated by brain mesocorticolimbic systems (dopamine-related systems) and sometimes called ‘wanting’ (in quotation marks), to distinguish it from cognitive forms of desire (wanting without quotation marks). Incentive salience as ‘wanting’ is separable also from pleasure ‘liking’ for the same reward, which has important implications for several human clinical disorders. Ordinarily, incentive salience adds motivational urgency to cognitive desires, but ‘wanting’ and cognitive desires can dissociate in some conditions. Excessive incentive salience can cause addictions, in which excessive ‘wanting’ can diverge from cognitive desires. Conversely, lack of incentive salience may cause motivational forms of anhedonia in depression or schizophrenia, whereas a negatively-valenced form of ‘fearful salience’ may contribute to paranoia. Finally, negative ‘fear’ and ‘disgust’ have both partial overlap but also important neural differences. (shrink)

Presenting a novel account of singular thought, a systematic application of recent work in the theory of speech acts, and a partial revival of Russell's analysis of singular terms, this book takes an original approach to the perennial problems of reference and singular terms by separating the underlying issues into different levels of analysis.

a comprehensive, somewhat Gricean theory of speech acts, including an account of communicative intentions and inferences, a taxonomy of speech acts, and coverage of many topics in pragmatics -/- .

We examine three assumptions commonly held in the corporate reputation literature: (1) reputation ratings of owners and investors are generally representative of all stakeholders; (2) stakeholders will generally provide a higher reputation rating to firms that emphasize corporate social responsibility versus firms that do not; and (3) profitability is the primary criterion of importance to all stakeholders when rating a firm's reputation. Using an exploratory in‐class exercise, our findings suggest that: (1) there are significant differences among stakeholder groups in their (...) reputation ratings; (2) firms that emphasize corporate social responsibility are not rated more highly across all stakeholder groups; and (3) for all stakeholder groups, the ethicality criterion explained more of the variance in firms' reputation ratings than the profitability criterion. (shrink)

Different brain mechanisms seem to mediate wanting and liking for the same reward. This may have implications for the modular nature of mental processes, and for understanding addictions, compulsions, free will and other aspects of desire. A few wanting and liking phenomena are presented here, together with discussion of some of these implications.

Symbolen, zo luidt de gemeenplaats, zijn een zaak van taal en kunst – van literatuur en plastische kunst, en ook wel van religie en spiritualiteit –, maar niet van politiek. Nochtans is de band tussen politiek en symboliek niet vreemd. Iedereen kent wel politieke symbolen of heeft het wel eens over symbooldossiers in de politiek. In wat volgt wil ik duidelijk maken dat dit te maken heeft met wat de politiek doet: het symboliseren van de gemeenschap.

Against a background of increasing regulation regarding access to medical information and the presentation of patients' confidentiality, the case of genetic information raises interesting questions about whether the application of general rules is appropriate in all situations. Whilst all genetic information is not equally sensitive, some of it is highly predictive. It also allows deductions to be made about other family members. It may not be regarded as particularly sensitive when compared to other types of medical information and those to (...) whom it applies may not be as anxious about preserving their confidentiality as compared with—for example, the prospect of seeing research into cause and cures for rare diseases put in hand. These distinctions also find resonance with the general public. Resolving conflicting tensions will require subtlety, not a blunt “one size fits all” model. (shrink)

Where does normal brain or psychological function end, and pathology begin? The line can be hard to discern, making disease sometimes a tricky word. In addiction, normal ‘wanting’ processes become distorted and excessive, according to the incentive-sensitization theory. Excessive ‘wanting’ results from drug-induced neural sensitization changes in underlying brain mesolimbic systems of incentive. ‘Brain disease’ was never used by the theory, but neural sensitization changes are arguably extreme enough and problematic enough to be called pathological. This implies that ‘brain disease’ (...) can be a legitimate description of addiction, though caveats are needed to acknowledge roles for choice and active agency by the addict. Finally, arguments over ‘brain disease’ should be put behind us. Our real challenge is to understand addiction and devise better ways to help. Arguments over descriptive words only distract from that challenge. (shrink)

Although it is possible to regard a species as a set with a special internal structure, it is preferable to regard a species as an individual precisely to emphasize this internal structure. It is necessary to recognize, moreover, that two organisms that are part of a single entity with respect to one process need not be part of a single entity with respect to another process. Furthermore, choosing to regard two entities (with respect to one process) as conspecific is not (...) to deny that there are two entities within this species. Thus, the systematist need not propose formal names for every entity he discovers, but the names he proposes ought to be as faithful to the relationship among the entities as is possible. (shrink)

Influenced by the Wittgensteinian slogan “Don’t look for the meaning, look for the use,” ordinary language philosophers aimed to defuse various philosophical problems by analyzing key words in terms of what they are used to do or the conditions for appropriately using them. Although Moore, Grice and Searle exposed this error – mixing pragmatics with semantics – it still gets committed, now to a different end. Nowadays the aim is to reckon with the fact that the meanings of a great (...) many sentences underdetermine what we would normally mean in using them – even if the sentence is free of indexicality, ambiguity, and vagueness. This can be so because the sentence expresses a “minimal” proposition or even because it doesn’t fully express any proposition. Many theorists are led to defend “truth-conditional pragmatics” (or linguistic “contextualism”), to find a hidden indexical in every syntactic nook or semantic cranny, or otherwise to pay undue respect to seemingly semantic intuitions and intentions. This paper identifies various such moves and explains what’s regressive about them. (shrink)